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Feedback saddle point equilibria for soft-constrained
zero-sum linear quadratic descriptor differential game
MUHAMMADWAKHID MUSTHOFA, SALMAH, JACOB C. ENGWERDA and ARI SUPARWANTO
In this paper the feedback saddle point equilibria of soft-constrained zero-sum linear
quadratic differential games for descriptor systems that have index one will be studied for a
finite and infinite planning horizon. Both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a feedback saddle point equilibrium are considered.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade significant progress has been made in the study of linear quadratic
differential games. A linear quadratic differential game is a mathematical model that rep-
resents a conflict between different agents which control a dynamical system and each of
them is trying to minimize his individual quadratic objective function by giving a control
to the system. For this purpose, linear quadratic differential games have been applied
in many different fields like economic and management science [25], [4], to study is-
sues like e.g. economic competitions among companies and environmental management
games; military studies, to study armed conflicts; or parlor games, see e.g. [11]. More-
over, in optimal control theory it is well known that the issue to obtain robust control
strategies to solve the disturbance attenuation problem can be approached as a dynamic
game problem [1, 16, 3, 20].
Although the theory has been applied in many fields, however, an extension of
this theory is called for systems that can be modeled as a set of coupled differential
and algebraic equations. These, so-called, descriptor systems can be used to model
more accurately the structure of physical systems, including non-dynamic modes and
impulsive modes [13]. Applications of descriptor systems can be found in chemical
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processes [15], circuit systems [23, 24], economic systems [17], large-scale intercon-
nected systems [18, 29], mechanical engineering systems [12], power systems [28], and
robotics [19].
The study of differential games for descriptor systems was initiated by [10]. They
investigated the well-posedness of closed-loop Nash strategies with respect to singular
perturbations and presented a hierarchical reduction procedure to reduce the game to an
ordinary game which is well-posed. Further references that studied the time-continuous
games are [30, 31], while the discrete-time version of such games was studied by [32].
The index one case1 was studied by [6] for an open-loop information structure and in
[7, 8] for the feedback information structure. All of them solved the game by converting
it to a reduced ordinary game. The general index case was studied in [26], where the
theory of projector chains is used to decouple algebraic and differential parts of the
descriptor system, and then the usual theory of ordinary differential games is applied
to derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of feedback Nash
equilibria for linear quadratic differential games. Moreover, the open-loop framework of
soft-constrained descriptor differential game was studied in [20], also with its application
in robust optimal control design.
This paper is the continuation of the work of [7] and [1], where the general linear
quadratic differential game was considered for descriptor systems of index one. [1] have
studied the soft-constrained ordinary differential game while [7] have studied the feed-
back (hard-constrained) descriptor differential game with an infinite planning horizon.
By merging results from [1] and [7], in this paper, we study the feedback soft-constrained
zero-sum descriptor differential game. The problem addressed in this paper is to find the
smallest constraint value of g> 0 -that appears in the cost function of the game (see e.g
equation (2))- under which the game still has a Nash equilibrium and then to find the
corresponding controllers for both players. We consider the game for both a finite and
infinite planning horizon. We assume that players act non-cooperatively and the infor-
mation they have is the current value of the state. We solve the problem by changing the
descriptor differential game into a reduced ordinary differential game using the results
in [6] and [7]. Like in [7] in this paper we try to provide complete parametrization of
all feedback saddle point solution in term of descriptor systems. A different approach
for such problem has been done by [27] where the problem is solved directly without
modifying into ordinary game.
The feedback information structure implies that the resulting equilibrium actions
have the important property that they are strongly time consist. That is, the equilibrium
solution of the truncated game also remains an equilibrium solution for all consistent
initial conditions xt1 (that can be attained at t1 from some consistent initial state at t = 0
for every t1 2 (0; t f )) off the equilibrium path. This property is, e.g., not satisfied by
equilibrium actions constructed under an open-loop information structure [5].
1Index roughly translates to the number of differentiations required to represent a differential algebraic
equation as a differential equation.
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This paper is going to be organized as follows. Section 2 will include some basic re-
sults of linear quadratic differential games for descriptor systems and also state the main
problem of this paper. Section 3 will present the main results for the soft-constrained
zero-sum game both on a finite and infinite planning horizon as well as both for g = 1
and g 6= 1. Section 4 will illustrate in an example some results from the previous sections.
At last, section 5 will conclude.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper we consider a game modeled by the set of coupled differential and
algebraic equations
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t)+B1u1 (t)+B2u2 (t) ; x(0) = x0 (1)
where E;A 2 R(n+r)(n+r), rank(E) = n, Bi 2 R(n+r)mi and x0 is the consistent initial
state 2 (see (10) for a characterization). Vectors ui 2Us are the actions player i can use to
control the system, whereUs represents the set of all admissible actions for both players.
The first player (minimizer) has a quadratic cost functional Jg given by
Jg (u1;u2)=
t fZ
0

xT (t)Q¯x(t)+uT1 (t) R¯1u1 (t)  guT2 (t) R¯2u2 (t)

dt+ xT (t f ) Q¯t f x(t f ) (2)
where the parameter g 2 R is a weighting for the action of the second player who likes
to maximize Jg (or, stated differently, to minimize  Jg). The game defined by (1,2) is
called the (zero-sum) soft-constrained differential game. This terminology is used to
capture the feature that in this game there is no hard bound with respect to u2 [1].
We start this section by stating some required basic results. First, we recall from [2]
some results concerning the descriptor system
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t)+ f (t) ; x(0) = x0 (3)
and the associated matrix pencil
lE A: (4)
System (3) and (4) are said to be regular if the characteristic polynomial is not identically
zero. System (3) has a unique solution for any consistent initial state if and only if it is
regular. Then, from [9] we recall the so-called Weierstrass’ canonical form.
Theorem 2 If (4) is regular, then there exist nonsingular matrices X and Y such that
Y TEX =
"
In 0
0 N
#
and Y TAX =
"
A1 0
0 Ir
#
(5)
2An initial state is called consistent if with this choice of the initial state the system (1) has a solution.
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where A1 is a matrix in Jordan form whose elements are the finite eigenvalues, Ik 2Rkk
is the identity matrix and N is a nilpotent matrix also in Jordan form. A1 and N are
unique up to permutation of Jordan blocks.
Then, throughout this paper the next assumptions are made w.r.t system (1) (see also [7]
and [14]):
1. matrix E is singular
2. det(lE A) 6= 0
3. system (1) impulse controllable
4. matrix N = 0 in (5).
Assumption 4. implies that system (1) has index one.
Following the procedure in [21] and [22] yield that (u1 (t) ;u

2 (t)) is a saddle point
solution for the differential game (1,2) if and only if (u1 (t) ;u

2 (t)) is a saddle point
solution for the differential game defined by dynamical system
x˙1 (t) = A1x1 (t)+Y1B1u1 (t)+Y1B2u2 (t) ; x1 (0) =
h
In 0
i
X 1x0 (6)
with the cost function for first player
Jg (u1;u2) =
t fZ
0

zT (t)Mgz(t)
	
dt+ xT1 (t f )Qt f x1 (t f ) (7)
where
"
x1 (t)
x2 (t)
#
= X 1x(t), x1 (t) 2Rn, x2 (t) 2Rr, zT (t) =
h
xT1 (t) u
T
1 (t) u
T
2 (t)
i
and
Mg =
264 Q V WV T R1¯1¯ N
W T NT R2¯2¯g
375 : (8)
The spellings of the matrices defined in (8) and other additional notation that will be
used throughout this paper are presented in the Appendix.
In this feedback information framework we assume that the controls given by both
players are in linear feedback control form defined by
ui (t) = Fi(t)x(t) 2Us; i= 1;2; (9)
where Fi(t) is a piecewise continuous function. Furthermore, as has been discussed in
[7], the set of consistent initial states for system (1) isn
x1 (0) ;x2 (0)
x2 (0) = S 1 h B12 B22 iFX1x1(0); x1(0) 2 Rno : (10)
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Following the procedure in [7], we have that (u1 (t) ;u

2 (t)) is a saddle point solution
for the differential game (6,7) if and only if
eF1 (t) ; eF2 (t) is a saddle point solution
for the differential game defined by the dynamical system
x˙1 (t) =
 
A1+
h
B11 B21
i" eF1(t)eF2(t)
#!
x1 (t) ; x1 (0) =
h
In 0
i
X 1x0 (11)
with cost function for the first player
Jg
eF1; eF2= t fZ
0
8><>:xT1 (t)
h
I eFT1 eFT2 i eMg
264 IeF1eF2
375x1 (t)
9>=>;dt+ xT1 (t f )Qt f x1 (t f ) (12)
where
eMg =
264 eQ eV eWeV T eR11 eNeW T eNT eR22g
375 :
Now, we define our main object of study in this paper, the feedback saddle point
(FSP) equilibrium [6], [5].
Definition 1 (F1 (t);F2 (t)) 2Us is a FSP equilibrium for the differential game (1,2) if
for every (F1(t);F

2 (t)) ;(F1(t);F

2 (t)) 2Us,
Jg (F1 (t);F2(t))¬ Jg (F1 (t);F2 (t))¬ Jg (F1(t);F2 (t)) :
Then, the addressed problem in this paper is to find the set of g such that the differential
game (1,2) has a FSP solution ui (t) = Fi(t)x(t). Furthermore, in case the FSP solution
exists, we want to characterize the set of FSP solutions. This, both for a finite and infinite
planning horizon.
3. Soft-constrained linear quadratic descriptor differential game
3.1. Finite planing horizon
In this section we will characterize the set of FSP solutions for the game (1,2) using
the reduced ordinary differential game described by the dynamical system (11) with the
cost function (12). For g= 1 the problem reduces to find the FSP solutions for the game
J1
eF1; eF2= t fZ
0
8><>:xT1 (t)
h
I eFT1 eFT2 i eM
264 IeF1eF2
375x1 (t)
9>=>;dt+ xT1 (t f )Qt f x1 (t f ) (13)
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where
eM =
264 eQ eV eWeV T eR11 eNeW T eNT eR22
375 :
From [7] one straightforwardly derives the next result.
Theorem 3 Assume that g = 1, matrix eG is invertible, the matrices eQ and Qt f are sym-
metric and eRii > 0; i = 1;2. Then (F1(t);F2(t)) is an FSP equilibrium for (1,2) for eve-
ry consistent initial state if and only if Fi(t) = eFi(t)O+(t)+ Zi (I O(t)O+(t)), where
Zi 2Rmi(n+r), O(t) = X
"
I
 B12 eF1(t) B22 eF2(t)
#
, O+ denotes the Moore-Penrose in-
verse of O and
eF1(t); eF2(t) are given by" eF1(t)eF2(t)
#
=  eG 1" BT11K1(t)+ eV T1 BT21K1(t)  eW T1
#
where K1(t) is the symmetric solution of the Riccati differential equation (RDE) on [0; t f ]
K˙ (t) = AT1K (t) K (t)A1  eQ+h eV +K (t)B11 eW +K (t)B21 i eG 1

h eV +K (t)B11   eW +K (t)B21 iT ; K (t f ) = Q¯t f : (14)
Moreover, the saddle point value of the game is L1 = xT0X
 T
h
I 0
iT
K1
h
I 0
i
X 1x0:
Next, for g 6= 1, in order to guarantee the differential game (1,2) has an FSP solution
we must assure that the following Riccati differential equation
K˙ (t) = AT1K (t) K (t)A1  eQ+h eV +K (t)B11 eW +K (t)B21 i eG 1g

h eV +K (t)B11   eW +K (t)B21 iT ; K (t f ) = Q¯t f : (15)
does not have a conjugate point on [0; t f ]. Following [1], the next lemma is useful to
characterize when the Riccati differential equation (15) has a solution.
Lemma 1 For g large enough, the Riccati differential equation (15) has a solution on
[0; t f ].
Therefore, it makes sense to introduce the following nonempty set
GCL = finfG1; infG2g ; gˆCL =maxGCL (16)
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where
G1 =
neg> 0 8g>eg; eR22g > 0o
G2 =
eg> 0 8g>eg; the RDE (15) does not have a conjugate point on [0; t f ]	 :
For g= gˆCL we have the next two lemmas [1].
Lemma 2 For g= gˆCL the Riccati differential equation (15) has a conjugate point.
Lemma 3 For any fixed x0 2 Rn+r, the function min
F1
Jg (F1;F2) has a finite supremum in
F2 2Us if g> gˆCL, and only if g­ gˆCL.
Lemma 1 to 3 above along with Theorem 3 in [7] can be used to arrive at the following
theorem (see also [1] for the ordinary game).
Theorem 4 Consider the linear quadratic zero-sum soft-constrained differential game
with a feedback information structure (1,2) defined on the interval [0; t f ], assume thateR11; eR22g > 0 and let the parameter gˆCL be as defined by (16). Then:
1. For g> gˆCL, the Riccati differential equation (15) does not have a conjugate point
on the interval [0; t f ].
2. For g> gˆCL, the differential game (1,2) admits an FSP solution, which is given by
Fi(t) = eFi(t)O+(t)+Zi  I O(t)O+(t) (17)
where Zi 2 Rmi(n+r),
O(t) = X
"
I
 B12 eF1(t) B22 eF2(t)
#
and
eF1(t); eF2(t) are given by
" eF1(t)eF2(t)
#
=  eG 1g
"
BT11K1g(t)+ eV T1
 BT21K1g(t)  eW T1
#
; (18)
where K1g(t) is the symmetric solution of the Riccati differential equation (15).
3. For g> gˆCL, the saddle point value of the game is
Lg = xT0X
 T
h
I 0
iT
K1g(0)
h
I 0
i
X 1x0:
4. If eR22gˆCL > 0, for g< gˆCL the differential game has an unbounded upper value for
all F1 2Us as well as an unbounded lower value.
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Proof Part 1 of the theorem follows from the definition of (16). Next consider part 2.
Since (15) does not have a conjugate point on the interval [0; t f ] then there exists a K1g(t)
as a solution of (15). By Theorem 3 in [7] we have then that (18) is the unique FBSP
solution for the reduced game (11,12). From the relationship
eFi := FiX " I
H
#
; (19)
we have then that the set of all FBSP solutions are given by (17). Part 3 follows directly
from Theorem 3 in [7]. Finally, part 4 follows from part (ii) of Theorem 4.2 in [1].
3.2. Infinite planning horizon
In this section we consider the infinite planning horizon case, that is the game defined
by dynamical system (1) with cost function, to be minimized for the first player,
J¥g (u;w) =
¥Z
0

xT (t) Q¯x(t)+uT (t) R¯1u(t)  gwT (t) R¯2w(t)

dt (20)
or, equivalently,
J¥g
eF1; eF2= ¥Z
0
8><>:xT1 (t)
h
I eFT1 eFT2 i eMg
264 IeF1eF2
375x1 (t)
9>=>;dt (21)
and for the second player  J¥g .
For well-posedness sake of the cost functional we restrict, in this section we also
restrict the controller in the sense that it must stabilize the system for all consistent
initial states. As discussed in [7] we assume that the feedback matrix F belongs to the
set
F :=
(
F =
h
FT1 F
T
2
i all finite eigenvalues of(E;A+BF) are stableand(E;A+BF) has index one;
)
(22)
where B =
h
B1 B2
i
. That is, we assume that the matrix pairs (A1;Bi1) ; i = 1;2, are
stabilizable. So, in principle, each player is capable to stabilize the first part of the trans-
formed system on his own. Furthermore, to ensure that such a stabilizing control for
player one is generated naturally through the solution (optimization) process, unstable
modes of A1 will have to be observable through eQ. So, we make the assumption that the
pair

A1; eQ 12 is detectable [1].
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For g= 1 we get the special form for cost function (21):
J¥
eF1; eF2= ¥Z
0
8><>:xT1 (t)
h
I eFT1 eFT2 i eM
264 IeF1eF2
375x1 (t)
9>=>;dt: (23)
Instead of the Riccati differential equation (14) we consider the following associated
algebraic Riccati equation which will play an important role in this section
AT1K1+K1A1+ eQ1 heV1+K1B11 eW1+K1B21i eG 1heV1+K1B11  eW1+K1B21iT=0: (24)
From [7] we obtain straightforwardly the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Assume that g= 1, matrix eG is invertible and the matrices eRii > 0; i= 1;2.
Then (F1;F2) is an FSP equilibrium for (1,2) for every consistent initial state if and
only if Fi = eFiO+ + Zi (I OO+), where Zi 2 Rmi(n+r), O = X " I B12 eF1 B22 eF2
#
and
eF1; eF2 are given by" eF1eF2
#
=  eG 1" BT11K1+ eV T1 BT21K1  eW T1
#
;
where K1 is the symmetric solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (24) such that
A1 
h
B11 B21
i eG 1" BT11K1+ eV T1 BT21K1  eW T1
#
is stable. Moreover, the cost for player one is L1 = xT0X
 T
h
I 0
iT
K1
h
I 0
i
X 1x0
and for player two is  L1.
To prove for g 6= 1 in the next theorems, let us introduce the counterpart of (16)
G¥CL = finfG¥1 ; infG¥2 g ; g¥ =maxG¥CL; (25)
where
G¥1 =
neg> 0 8g­eg; eR22g > 0o ;
G¥2 =
eg> 0 8g­eg; J¯¥g := infF12Us supF22Us J¥g (F1;F2)¬ 0

:
Here J¯¥g denotes the upper value of the game (1,20). We also introduce the following
algebraic Riccati equation corresponding to the Riccati differential equation (15)
AT1K1+K1A1+ eQ1 heV1+K1B11 eW1+K1B21i eG 1g heV1+K1B11  eW1+K1B21iT=0: (26)
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The next theorem characterizes when the game defined by (11,21) has a finite upper
value if Q­ 0 (see [1] for the proof).
Theorem 6 Let (A1;Bi1), i = 1;2 be stabilizable and

A1; eQ 12 be detectable. Then,
there exists a finite scalar g¥ > 0 such that for all g > g¥ the game defined by (11,21)
has finite upper value, i.e.,
J¯¥g (x0)< ¥; for all x0 2 Rn+r; (27)
and there exists a nonnegative definite solution to (26), say K+1g, with the further property
that
Fˆ+g := A1 
h
B11 B21
i eG 1g
"
BT11K
+
1g+
eV T1
 BT21K+1g  eW T1
#
(28)
is stable.
Such solution K+1g has the following additional properties (for all g> g
¥ ):
1. K+1g > 0, if

A1; eQ 12 is observable;
2. K+1g is the unique solution of (26) in the class of nonnegative definite matrices that
satisfy (28);
3. In the class of nonnegative definite matrices, K+1g is the minimal solution of (26);
4. The matrix
Aˆ1g := A1 
h
B11 0
i eG 1g
"
BT11K
+
1g+
eV T1
0
#
(29)
is stable;
5. J¯¥g (x0) := supeF22Us J
¥
g
eF1 ; eF2= xT0X T h I 0 iT K+1g h I 0 iX 1x0, where
eF1 = h I 0 i eG 1g
"
BT11K
+
1g+
eV T1
 BT21K+1g  eW T1
#
; (30)
6. K+1g = limt f!¥
K1g (t; t f ) for Qt f = 0:
If g < g¥, the upper value is infinite, and (26) has no real solution which also satisfies
property 4.
Next, the assumption of detectability of

A1; eQ 12 can be relaxed by requiring that
the system trajectory be asymptotically stable [1]. We present this consequence in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 7 Let (A1;Bi1), i = 1;2 be stabilizable, Q ­ 0 and

A1; eQ 12 have no unob-
servable modes on the imaginary axis. Then, there exists a finite scalar g¥ > 0, such that
for all g > g¥ the game in which player one is restricted to stabilizing controllers has a
finite upper value, i.e.,
J¯¥g (x0) := infeF12Us:x(¥)=0 supeF22Us J
¥
g
eF1; eF2< ¥; for all x0 2 Rn+r;
and there exists a nonnegative definite solution to (26), say eK1g, with the further property
that eˆFg := A1 h B11 B21 i eG 1g
"
BT11 eK1g+ eV T1
 BT21 eK1g  eW T1
#
(31)
is stable.
Such solution eK1g has the following additional properties (for all g> g¥):
1. eK1g = limt f!¥K1g (t; t f ) ; for Qt f = eS; where eS is the unique maximal solution of the
algebraic Riccati equation associated with the limiting control problem
AT1 S+SA1  (SY1B1+V1)R 111
 
BT1Y
T
1 S+V
T
1

+Q= 0; (32)
2. eK1g is the unique solution of (26) in the class of nonnegative definite matrices that
satisfy (31);
3. In the class of nonnegative definite matrices K1 with the property K1 ­ eS, eK1g is
the minimal solution of (26);
4. The matrix eA1g := A1 B11 eG 1g hBT11 eK1g+ eV T1 i is stable;
5. J¯¥g := supeF22Us J
¥
g
eF1 ; eF2= xT0X T h I 0 iT eK1g h I 0 iX 1x0, where
eF1 = h I 0 i eG 1g
"
BT11 eK1g+ eV T1
 BT21 eK1g  eW T1
#
:
If g < g¥, the upper value is infinite, and (26) has no real solution which also satisfies
property 4.
Next, we characterize FSP solutions for the infinite-horizon linear quadratic soft-
constrained differential game (1,20). One of the interesting questions in this situation is
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if (15) does not have a conjugate point on [0; t f ] for any t f and in case lim
t f!¥
K1 (t; t f ) = K¯1
exists, does this necessarily imply that the pair" eF1eF2
#
=  eG 1g
"
BT11K¯1+ eV T1
 BT21K¯1  eW T1
#
(33)
is in saddle point equilibrium? [1] has shown that there is no continuity in the saddle
point property of the maximizers feedback policy, as t f !¥, whereas there is continuity
in the value of the game and in the feedback policy of the minimizer. Applying this fact
and Theorem 5 to the infinite-horizon linear quadratic soft-constrained differential game
(1,20) yields then the following theorem (see [1] for the ordinary game).
Theorem 8 Consider the infinite-horizon linear quadratic soft-constrained differential
game (1,20)with a feedback information structure. Assume an arbitrary consistent initial
state x0 2 Rn+r, Qt f = 0. Moreover assume that eR11; eR22g > 0 and the pair A1; eQ 12 is
detectable. Then:
1. For each fixed t, the solution to (15), K1 (t; t f ), is nondecreasing in t f , that is if
(15) has no conjugate point in a given interval [0; t f ], then
K1
 
t; t f ‘
 K1  t; t“f ­ 0; t f > t‘f > t“f ­ 0;
2. If there exists a nonnegative definite solution of (26), there is a minimal solution,
denoted K+1g. This matrix has the property that K
+
1g K1

t; t f

­ 0 for all t f ­ 0,
where K1

t; t f

is the solution of (15) with Qt f = 0. If

A1; eQ 12 is observable,
then every nonnegative definite solution of (26) is positive definite;
3. The differential game (1,20) has equal upper and lower values if and only if the
algebraic Riccati equation (26) admits a nonnegative definite solution, in which
case the common value is
L¥g = x
T
0X
 T
h
I 0
iT
K+1g
h
I 0
i
X 1x0;
4. If the upper value is finite for some g > 0, (say, g = g¥), then it is bounded and
equal the lower value for all g> g¥;
5. If K+1g ­ 0 exists let Fi be given by
Fi = eFi O++Zi  I OO+ ; (34)
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where Zi 2 Rmi(n+r), O= X
"
I
 B12 eF1  B22 eF2
#
, eF1 and eF2 are given by
" eF1eF2
#
=  eG 1g
"
BT11K
+
1g+
eV T1
 BT21K+1g  eW T1
#
: (35)
Then F1 is the steady-state feedback controller attains the finite upper value, in
the sense that
sup
F22Us
J¥g (F

1 ;F2) = L
¥
g = x
T
0X
 T
h
I 0
iT
K+1g
h
I 0
i
X 1x0; (36)
and F2 is the maximizing feedback solution in (20).
6. If the upper value is bounded for some g> 0, (say, g= g¥), then for all g> g¥, the
two feedback matrices (28) and (29) are asymptotically stable;
7. For g > g¥, K+1g ­ 0 is the unique solution of (26) in the class of nonnegative
definite matrices which make Fˆg stable;
8. Since (A1;Bi1), i= 1;2 are stabilizable then the upper value is bounded for some
finite g> 0.
Proof Similar as in the proof of Theorem 4, we can restrict for the proof of most state-
ments to the reduced order system. For part 1 – 4 see part (i) – (iv) of Theorem 4.8
from [1]. Part 5 follows by using the relationship (19) again, using the results of The-
orem 3 from [7]. Finally, part 6 – 8 result again, from part (vi) – (viii) of Theorem 4.8
in [1].
The more general version of Theorem 8 can be obtained by relaxing the detectability
condition of

A1; eQ 12. For this condition by letting g 2 = 0 in (26) we arrive at the stan-
dard algebraic Riccati equation (32) that arises in linear regulator theory for descriptor
system (see also [1] for the ordinary game). Let eS+ ­ 0 denote its maximal solution. We
are now in position to state the following theorem (For a proof we refer to Theorem 4.8’
in [1]).
Theorem 9 Consider the framework of Theorem 8, but with (A1;Bi1), i= 1;2; stabiliz-
able and

A1; eQ 12 having no unobservable modes on the imaginary axis. Let eS+ be the
unique maximal solution of (32). Then:
1. There exists a finite g > 0, (say, g = g¥), such that for all g > g¥, the upper value
is bounded, and for g< g¥, it is unbounded;
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2. For all g > g¥, in the class of all symmetric matrices bounded from below by eS+,
there is a minimal one that solves (26), to be denoted eK+1g. This matrix has the
additional property that eK+1g K1t; t f­ 0 for all t f ­ 0, where K1t; t f is the
solution of (14) with Qt f = eS+ and g fixed;
3. For all g> g¥, the differential game has equal upper and lower value. The common
value of the game is
L¥g = x
T
0X
 T
h
I 0
iT eK+1g h I 0 iX 1x0;
4. For all g > g¥, the steady-state FSP equilibrium Fi given by Fi = eFi O+ +
Zi (I OO+), where Zi 2Rmi(n+r), O= X
"
I
 B12 eF1  B22 eF2
#
; F1 and eF2 are
given by (35). F1 attains the finite upper value L
¥
g , and
sup
F22Us
J¥g (F

1 ;F2) = L
¥
g = x
T
0X
 T
h
I 0
iT eK+1g h I 0 iX 1x0:
The maximizing feedback solution above then is F2 ;
5. For all g > g¥, the two matrices (28) and (29) are stable (again with eK+1g taken
above);
6. For all g > g¥, the matrix eK+1g defined in 2. is the unique solution of (26) in the
class of nonnegative definite matrices which make (28) stable;
7. For g< g¥, the algebraic Riccati equation (26) has no real solution that also makes
(29) stable.
4. Numerical example
Consider the zero-sum game between player 1 and player 2 defined by the system
Ex˙(t) = Ax(t)+B1u1 (t)+B2u2 (t) ; x(0) = x0 (37)
and cost function to be minimized by player 1
J1g (u1;u2) =
¥R
0

xT (t) Q¯x(t)+uT1 (t) R¯1u1 (t)   g uT2 (t) R¯2u2 (t)
	
dt (38)
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/2/16 2:12 AM
FEEDBACK SADDLE POINT EQUILIBRIA FOR SOFT-CONSTRAINED
ZERO-SUM LINEAR QUADRATIC DESCRIPTOR DIFFERENTIAL GAME 487
where E =
"
0 0
1  1
#
, A =
"
0 1
1  2
#
, B1 =
"
1
0
#
, B2 =
"
1
1
#
, Q¯ =
"
5 1
0 1
#
,
R¯1 = [1], R¯2 = [3], x(0) =
"
1
0
#
and x(t) =
"
x1 (t)
x2 (t)
#
2R2. Player 1 is the minimizing
player which controls the slow dynamics of the systems (described by the state x1 (t)),
using the control u1 (t) ; whereas player 2 is the maximizing player who controls the
fast dynamics of the systems (described by the state x2 (t)), using control u2 (t). With
Y T =
"
1 1
1 0
#
and X =
"
1 1
0 1
#
the matrix pencil (E;A) can be rewritten into its
Weierstrass’ canonical form (5) where X1 = Y T2 =
"
1
0
#
, X2 = Y T1 =
"
1
1
#
, N = [0],
and J = [1]. Then, the game can be described by (11,21) with matrix eMg and eGg :
eMg =
264 1  3  3 3 14 13
 3 13 11+ g
375 and eGg =
"
14 13
 13 11+ g
#
;
respectively. Using (35) we have" eF1eF2
#
=
24 (24+g)K+1g 3g 7214g 15 K+1g+3
14g 15
35
where K+1g =
34g+114 
p
1176g2+7324g 7428
2g+46 is the nonnegative definite solution of the alge-
braic Riccati equation
 (g+23)K+21g +(34g+114)K+1g+(5g 222) = 0;
such that
(23+ g)K+1g+11g 84
14g 15 < 0: (39)
Solving (39) above, we get g¥ = 1514 = 1:0714. Furthermore, after some calculations,
matrix O and O+ result as
O=
24  (23+g)K+1g+17g+7014g 15
  (23+g)K
+
1g 3g 85
14g 15
35 and O+ = h Q1 Q2 i
respectively, where
Q1 =
196g2 420g+225 
g2+ g+529

K+21g  
 
6g2+69g+3979

K+1g+205g2+90g+7550
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and
Q2 =   196g3+4928g2+9435g 5175K+1g+2156g3 2422g2+4200g+225
(143g3 g2+7391g 7935)K+21g  (84g3+856g2+54671g 59685)K+1g+2870g3 1815g2+93350g+116250
:
If g= 3:5, this yields the next set of equilibrium strategies (34) (see Theorem 8):"
F1
F2
#
=
"
 0:4520  0:3216
0:0164 0:0117
#
+
"
z11 z12
z21 z22
#"
0:3099  0:4910
 0:4356 0:6901
#
(40)
=:
"
F11 F

12
F21 F

22
#
where zi j 2 R; i; j= 1;2:
Next, to analyze the robustness property of the strategies above, we consider the
system if one uses the equilibrium actions Fi from (40) to control dynamical system
(37). Then the closed-loop system is described by"
1 0
0 0
#
x˙(t) =
"
1+F11+2F

21 F

11+F

12+2F

21+2F

22
F11+F

21 1+F

11+F

12+F

21+F

22
#
x(t) =: Aclx(t) : (41)
To increase robustness, the players have to choose the zi j 2 R; i; j = 1;2 in such a way
that the closed-loop system (41) becomes as stable as possible. Therefore, we need to
determine zi j 2 R; i; j = 1;2 in such a way that the real part of the largest root of the
polynomial in l
z(zi j; i; j = 1;2) :=
( l 1 F11 2F21  F11 F12 2F21 2F22 F11 F21  1 F11 F12 F21 F22
= 0
)
is minimal. Elementary calculations show that
l=
(1+F11+F

12+F

21+F

22)+(F

11+2F

21+F

12F

21 F11F22)
1+F11+F

12+F

21+F

22
:
So, to enforce a minimal real part of l the next two conditions must be satisfied 1+
F11+F

12+F

21+F

22 = e (where e is a small positive number) and F11+2F21+F12F21 
F11F

22 > 0. Then, as there is a lot of freedom in the choice of the zi j values, by choosing
zi j accordingly the system becomes as stable as possible. Numerical simulations show
that, choosing z11 and z21 as small as possible and z12 and z22 as big as possible, will
attain a robust strategy for the game (37,38).
Another option to increase robustness occurs if the parameter g 2 G¥CL could be cho-
sen freely by the players. Then, choosing g = g¥+ e for e sufficiently small will make
the closed loop system as stable as possible. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal trajectory of
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Figure 1. Optimal trajectory of state x1 (t)
Figure 2. Equilibrium actions
 
u1 = F

1 x;u

2 = F

2 x

Figure 3. The comparison of the optimal trajectory uses open-loop and feedback controller
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state x1 (t) when player 1 uses the equilibrium strategies (40) for different values of g.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium actions of the game used by both players for g= 3:5.
Compared to the open-loop controller, the feedback controller has advantages in terms
of speed to reach stability. Based on the results obtained in [20], Figure 3 shows a com-
parison of the optimal trajectory obtained if the system uses the open-loop and feedback
controller, respectively.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper studies the linear quadratic zero-sum soft-constrained differential game
for descriptor systems which have index one. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of an FSP equilibrium have been derived. The paper shows how the solution
of the game depends on a Riccati differential equation for the finite horizon case and an
algebraic Riccati equation for the infinite horizon. The paper also shows how the critical
value gˆCL for finite planning horizon and g¥ for infinite planning horizon play a key role.
A numerical example illustrating some of the theoretical results is presented.
The problem addressed in this paper is restricted to index one descriptor systems. To
find an FSP equilibrium in a zero-sum game that has higher order index is still an open
problem to be analyzed.
Appendix
We use the next shorthand notation in this paper:
Q := XT1 Q¯X1 =: eQ, V := XT1 Q¯X2Y2B1, W := XT1 Q¯X2Y2B2,
N := BT1Y
T
2 X
T
2 Q¯X2Y2B2, eV := XT1 Q¯X2B12+XT1 V , eW := XT1 Q¯X2B22+XT1 W ,eN := BT12XT2 Q¯X2B22 V TX2B22 BT12XT2 W +N, R1¯1¯ := BT1Y T2 XT2 Q¯X2Y2B1+ R¯1,eR11 := BT12XT2 Q¯X2B12 V TX2B12 BT12XT2 V +R11, R2¯2¯g := BT2Y T2 XT2 Q¯X2Y2B2  gR¯2,eR22 := BT22XT2 Q¯X2B22 W TX2B22 BT22XT2 W +R22,eR22g := BT22XT2 Q¯X2B22 W TX2B22 BT22XT2 W + gR22,
S := I+
h
B12 B22
i
FX2, F =
h
FT1 F
T
2
i
, Bi1 =
h
I 0
i
Y TBi,
Bi2=
h
0 I
i
Y TBi, eFi :=FiX " I
H
#
,H := 

I+
h
B12 B22
i
FX2
 1 h
B12 B22
i
FX1,
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eG= " eR11 eN1 eNT1 eR22
#
, eGg = " eR11 eN1 eNT1 eR22g
#
.
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